the Principle of Evidentialism

the evidencewhen at last a wise man fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. Second, DeRose claims that this difficulty highlights a fundamental complexity in the notion of evidence. In addition, it is only ones own mental information that is relevant to determining whether one is justified in believing that. When developing evidentialism in his introductory textbook, Epistemology, Richard Feldman presents the following example. What is said about (EVI) can be extended naturally to the rest of the doxastic attitudes and thereby applied to Feldman and Conees explicit thesis. A Pragmatic Reply William James has famously argued that having adequate evidence is not necessary for one to believe justifiably. One may here appeal to the distinction between propositional justification and doxastic justification in an effort to motivate the claim that the detective is justified in believing that Jones did it and the student is justified in believing that the argument is valid. Evidentialism allows for such possibilities. Haack terms this theory, foundherentism, as it blends elements of coherentism and foundationalism.

Criticizing or discrediting a proposition because of the source has some similarity to the. He does not look in todays paper. Clifford, would be justified in holding some scientific propositions that arent only true. Instead, he went about acting irrationally by seeking a (positive) justification of proposition by evidence the rest of Evidentialism followed, like.K. Thus, the response is that Bill does have an epistemic duty to believe what his evidence supports, even though he has overriding moral and prudential duties to believe that his wife was not having affairs. At first glance, at least, the "basic" beliefs of the foundationalist would appear to be counterexamples to the evidentialist's thesis, in that they are justified beliefs that are not rational because they are not supported by deeper evidence. The story depends on ones already being justified in believing some fundamental external world propositions. They write that doxastic attitude, d, toward p is justified for one at t if and only if ones evidence at t supports ones taking d towards p (15). And the skeptic here is utilizing an evidentialist demand to arrive at her skeptical conclusion.